THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE THEORY OF LAW
Pashukanis published the outlines of the commodity exchange theory of law in 192 Law and Marxism: A General Theory, and elaborated his ideas in later editions of the w Here the fundamentals of a contemporary critique of instrumentalism are already pres too, Pashukanis criticizes the emphasis given to the coercive aspects of law by o Marxists in surprisingly modern terms. In addition, Pashukanis attacks the claim of Marxist writers that bourgeois freedom and equality are mere shams whose only signif is to deceive the masses. Pashukanis' reply is that, far from being a sham, freedo equality -of a particular formal character -are the principles by which a bourgeois s operates. This insight is at the core of the commodity exchange theory of law.
To come to terms with the commodity exchange theory, events in the Soviet Union 1920s must be noted. In the aftermath of foreign invasion and civil war, the young S government faced difficult problems of socialist reconstruction. The jurists of Pashuk generation were particularly concerned with the legal manifestation of these problem the Czarist system was to be discarded was clear. But along what lines should a new sy be established? The classical Marxist texts on law did not provide a clear answer. Engel prophesied that the state would eventually wither away under socialism, but what of th run? Was a centralized state needed to organize the transition to socialism? What appropriate role for the Communist Party in this process? What legal principles, i should the state adopt? Soviet jurists held a wide range of views on these questi Typically, these views were linked to particular conceptions of the nature of law Throughout the twenties, a vigorous debate on the relationship between law, state socialist civil society filled the pages of Soviet legal journals (Jaworski: 1967: 27 Law and Marxism was a significant entry into this debate.
For Pashukanis, law is a unique form of social regulation. It creates a univers formally equal individuals whose concrete social and economic positions do not dete their legal status and capacities; class position disappears from cognizable legal rel The resulting abstracted individuals become the "subjects" of the law, possessed of and capable of arriving at agreements with other subjects. Contract is the paradigmatic of bourgeois law, and parties to legal relations are treated as "bearers of every ima legal claim." (19.78:119) Reflecting property relations, these claims are based upon of possession. Thus a system apparently composed of a mass of discrete, equivalent su preserves the aggregate inequality of capitalist class relations.
Commodity exchange requires that individuals be juridically free to acquire and ali property. The conflict of private interests in such transactions is the precondition for th regulation of private disputes. Law, therefore, emerges neither from consensus n "general will," but rather from conflicts inherent in the nature of capitalism; conflict allow for disputes of every sort except those that entail challenge to capitalism itself where commodity exchange as a fundamental economic relation is absent, the legal tion of contracts involving purchase or sale of goods and labor does not arise. M generally, Pashukanis' theory leads to the conclusion that capitalism could not exist w law; private and competitive entrepreneurs need its impersonal authority. The legal ca to perform exchange transactions (and to expect the state to uphold these transactions source of the notion that individuals -as distinct from families, classes, or associa are the sole bearers of rights. Implicitly, however, capitalist economic relations, bu From Substance to Form 71 the state, are the causal source juridical relation between the ind will be examined later.
One objection to any theory asserting a unique correspondence between law and mode of production is that many attributes of "capitalist law" are already present, if only embryonically, in the law of precapitalist societies. Pashukanis' formulation avoids this error, noting that commodity exchange is not entirely absent in such societies. With the triumph of capitalism, however, the commodity form comes to define all social relationships, destroying organic collectives and status distinction of the precapitalist world.
Commodity exchange, an economic transaction, according to the commodity exchange theory of law, must necessarily give birth to formal, possessive individualism. By extension, categories like race, sex, and national origin could be expected to become juridically irrelevant because the abstract equivalence of all legal subjects is an inextricable aspect of the growth of capitalism. The effect of these developments can be traced in law. For example, the distinction between public and private law, which rests on an institutional separation of government from property and a restriction on governmental powers to freely interfere with private contractual agreements was virtually unknown in the Middle Ages despite its existence in Roman law. And though the legal consequences of commodity exchange can be seen most fully in property law and commercial law, they are visible in criminal law as well. Pashukanis suggests that the retributive principle of equivalence between crime and penalty is based on the principles of commerce, but adds that it is only when capitalism reduces concrete labor to abstract labor power, measured by time, does imprisonment for a fixed term become the primary sanction.
The centrality of the formal properties of law in Pashukanis' analysis inevitably recalls Max Weber's treatment of law, but there are important differences. Weber considers rationality in legal discourse to be one of its formal characteristics, but Pashukanis does not. Further, Weber pays more attention to cultural and institutional influences on the historical development of law than does Pashukanis. A crucial contrast with the Weberian perspective stems from Pashukanis' commitment to the abolition of the legal form and with it the state. Weber believes that bureaucratic statist domination is inevitable in capitalist and socialist systems, and also insists on the autonomy of politics.
Contrasts with other major legal theorists outside the Marxian tradition are also useful. For Pashukanis, law cannot be understood as the commands of a sovereign -the view of Austin -nor is it merely a set of norms -as Kelsen has it. Rather, law orders social relations according to definite principles homologous to a society's commodity exchange system. That this ordering may be coercive is true but not distinctive. Nor does law exist in the realm of ideas alone, as is implied by those who regard its principles as deceptively false. Nevertheless, Pashukanis insists that law, one form of state activity, mystifies the true structure of capitalism.
There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the origins of legal relations in commodity exchange are obscured by legal doctrine, which gives them an a priori rationale. In other words, doctrine treats historically contingent relations as if they were self-evident and eternal principles. Second, contractual equality obscures the exploitation inherent in wage labor. But this exploitation and its mystification take place not because the principles of bourgeois justice are described inaccurately in law. As Marx demonstrates in Capital, it is through the routine operation of these principles that surplus labor is extracted in a capitalist society, and that its source is systematically parallels Marx's treatment of commodity feti relations. Hence, legal relations are both t takes the form of a general public authorit A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT While Pashukanis' work advances the Marxist theory of law by stipulating a pre theoretical connection between law and economy, his effort is not fully satisfactory. A noting that "the logic or juridical concepts corresponds to the logic of the social relation commodity-producing society" (1978:96), Pashukanis simply asserts that legal relatio directly generated by the existing social relations of production. This is hardly adequat it is the specificity of this "direct" generation that lies at the core of Pashukanis' theo challenge to legal instrumentalism. Indeed, the particular processes by which econ relations influence the law need to be addressed. Pashukanis concedes as much when he comments that the actual evolution of property law was "more complex" (1978:113) than in his simple scheme, though his own theory, he argues, demonstrates the significance of the trend. But what the complex mediations are and what might account for them the author does not say. In contrast, French structuralism seeks to account for such complexities in terms of the famous concepts of "relative autonomy" and "overdetermination". In more factual, historical terms, Weber, while conceding the great impact that merchants had on the development of commercial law, also considers such influences on law as the bureaucratic administrations of European monarchs, the organization of the legal profession, and the separation of church and state as analytically distinct from economic developments.
Despite Pashukanis' failure to articulate the concrete mediations that bring law into correspondence with class interests, it seems likely that he was correct in maintaining that the spread of the commodity form had a tendency to individualize and universalize European law during the emergence of capitalism. Yet, it was probably not the only process to do so. Of course, once other historical influences on law are considered, the question of the relative importance of different mediations is inevitable and calls a Marxian base-superstructure analysis into question. In this regard, the explanatory status of a "commodity form" in noneconomic social relations is problematic. To say that the connection is homologous or analogic fails to resolve the difficulty, for it is clear that economic relations are not substantively identical with political or legal ones, whatever their commonalities. Korsch's critical review of Law and Marxism similarly insists on the categorical non-identity of the legal form and the commodity form, and charges the Soviet scholar with having "obliterated" a truly Marxist materalist conception of law (1978:194) . Furthermore, by making commodity exchange the pivotal explanatory variable, Pashukanis implicitly accords greater significance to the way that commodities are distributed than to the way that they are produced. Again, Korsch scores Pashukanis for this unmarxian emphasis. An alternative criticism would attack the conceptualization of distribution only in terms of commodity exchange. Since distribution in precapitalist societies does not occur predominantly through commodity exchange, Pashukanis' theory tells us that the specific attributes that he regards as the essence of legality would have been found only to a small degree in the positive law and its actual enforcement in such social formations. The theory says nothing about the larger part of law in precapitalist societies, the part that does not embody principles of abstract, formal individualism. Nor can a theory which relies solely on a description of capitalist society with the importance of activities activity in this century has come -in wage, educational, health, a conflict over the priority given matters, particularly when priv Another problem is posed for P stances the spread of commodity of what Pashukanis suggests. Fo women had political rights in a were taken away in the Jacksoni tions that they had previously p law and society just at the time development can be understood in being transformed by economic no way of dealing with this. Like came to the family and the statu The prominence of racial distinc for Pashukanis. To date, South weakened by the growth of its ca of the antebellum American South weakened the slave system and it has become a less explicit featu commodity exchange relations Germany, Nazi law reintroduced r wherever the European powers made explicit distinctions betwe position of the colonial power a (Greenberg, 1980 Similarly, by failing to examine equality, the Soviet author fails to grasp equality as well as to see that this achie Jewish Question," Marx criticized religio politics from religion was not to free it f But he also insisted that, as far as it wen positive accomplishments. Evidently Pash treatment of formal equality. Indeed, his categories. Such an error turns a theore standpoint this is a cardinal error of bour point that social reality is produced, his
In this regard, the political quietism imp reinforced by Pashukanis' views about t social relations give rise almost automat social relations into existence (1978:88) . S juridical and socio-economic categories a taxation or other forms of state fiscal an kanis stresses only the form and never t remain unanswerable for him.
One central conclusion for the commodi such thing as proletarian law; law itself i movement would be wasting its time in t if such efforts could succeed, the impact contrasted this stance unfavorably with demands concerning law to a socialist pr rendered a priori by theoretical fiat.
Pashukanis' position that law cannot af from any argument about the nature of opportunities to influence class power practical gap here. Few Marxists will deny social transformation, but it is doubtfu Pashukanis' program.
Although Pashukanis maintained that la held that the underdevelopment of Soviet commodity exchange and the legal form its bourgeois characteristics during the new substantive content. Marx had taken the transition in the Critique of the Go elaborate the implications of this stance while a theory in itself cannot be held re articulate criteria for the abolition of law Soviet leaders' aggrandizement of state Similarly, some have argued -based u there are dangers in dispensing with due in a capitalist society (Neumann 1954 Alternatively, at the time of his writing, Pashukanis might have believed in the imminent arrival of universal socialist harmony, where inequality and injustice would be relics from the past. Finally, and less speculatively, it can be persuasively argued that Pashukanis' major theoretical and political concerns were oriented around a vindication of the power of the Soviet state in the period of putative transition to communism. Still, the tenor of Law and Marxism is clear; it demands the abolition of law as a condition of liberation. If the legal form is necessarily a bourgeois fetish, then it has no place in a society once capitalism has been overthrown. To those who maintained that law must be preserved to protect individuals against victimization even in socialist societies, Pashukanis replied that since under socialism the lines separating individuals from one another will become blurred, self-aggrandizement at the expense of others will be inconceivable (1978: 32, 155 ). An assessment of such claims rests in part on the plausibility of the notion that self-seeking and instrumentalist behavior toward others originates in commodity exchange alone. Pashukanis ultimately makes no serious effort to demonstrate that this is so.
Concomitantly, Pashukanis never explores alternative political forms to the centralized state. Workers councils or soviets -for the provision of collective self-goverance and justice in the public sphere after the abolition of the legal commodity fetish and the statego unmentioned. Such omissions are serious flaws in his work and cannot be ignored by contemporary theorists.
AN ALTHUSSERIAN EXTENSION
In Ownership of the Image, Edelman, like Pashakanis, grapples with the linkag commodity exchange and the legal form in bourgeois society. Each theorist views law as product of commodity relations. In order to facilitate such relations, bourgeois legal sub are construed as equals and thus as juridical representations of economic subjects in a soc dominated by exchange value rather than by use value. Unlike Pashukanis, howeve Edelman does not claim that these features of capitalist law exhaust all discussion of topic. And Edelman develops a unique analysis of the ideological ("imaginary") dim sions of the legal form.
In line with the structuralist effort to eliminate a priori subjectivity from a Mar science, Edelman's most novel contribution to legal theory emerges from his elaborati the bourgeois ideology-legal subject nexus. The legal subject and its corollary, the form, he argues, rest on bourgeois ideology. Such ideology views the individual as som who owns himself. He is animated by of his labor power and his possessions an anti-subject counterproposal for a
The quintessential rights, formal fr exist -whether natural to individuals o objective characteristics of capitalist co these subjects and their social relations, ist society by disguising its origins exploitative social relations, based on necessary for exploitation to continue who "chooses" to enter into commodi These arguments are derived from M usser's treatment of capitalist exploit concepts as they are relevant to a gen specific legal problems concerning th and cinema, and the political rights o A major part of Edelman's book is de law regarding the ownership of photog courts were asked to decide whether example, a street scene, could be cop grounds that photography was a mecha product with the personality of its cre protect. At that time, the law was re machine, like the camera, could be a c immanent legal reasoning and more a r argues that disqualification of rights o economic exigencies.
Early in the twentieth century, comm millions of people who worked in the copyright protection were not extende mere physical photographic image w legal criteria provides for what Ede something owned by one person, for e form of a photographic image which i cites no substantiating evidence) that largely in the form of significant amo revision in this field. What is of part decision: since photography involves the imprint of its author. In turn, th (commodity owner) and to establish th act of photographic creation. This "jur 1. It is interesting to note that Edelman chos creativity and intellectual labor -things con property -for his structuralist aims. between commodities, commo legal perspective.2
The introduction of film photo without copyright protection t with the capital-intensive intr alternatives to the provision o Unlike still photography, film director, script-writer, actors, requires that legal rights take t own something. If ownership i responsible for the product and on the film is to be recognized producer because he bore the assimilated to the category of were legally entitled to wages b Whatever cinema's differences shared. In both cases, new, pri have come into existence throu and persons. Consider: A photo who publishes it in a book of ph book. That such "overappropr commodity form is a built-in te legal subjects from property ow be achieved, is an equally impo
In pursuing his structuralist decision and the reasoning used industry. In this regard, capital doctrinally it preserves the indi bourgeois ideology of individu between the need to accommodat the court did not hesitate to en of the latter. Thus, Edelman id capitalist economic and ideolo On this basis, Edelman rests h recognized as the true creative judicial decisions. The utility of collective legal subjects, howev foreign to express acknowledg societies is a collective owner so 2. Nevertheless, the practical applicatio contested as late as 1959. (Edelman, 1978:50) 3. In taking this position, Edelman is nodding in the direction of those who have argued for the partial autonomy of law from the ruling class, but only slightly. As Edelman portrays the courts, the substance of their decision is always aligned with capitalist class interests. The language in which decisions are expressed, however, is governed by an autonomous legal tradition. Thus form is autonomous, but not content. Nevertheless, Edelman's conclusion is meant to overcome any lingering objections to the position that creativity or intellect, whatever their socially derived content, are distinctive properties of individual subjects. For him, the character of individuals is constituted by bourgeois ideology with its stress on individual consciousness and voluntarism.
Edelman argues that as the film industry evolves along capitalist lines, it poses questions for the courts which "embarass" existing bourgeois doctrine. In order to avoid contradictions between the legal apparatus and capitalist development, the courts decide the disputes that are brought to them in ways that are compatible with the requirements of industry. Yet, to legitimate their decisions, jurists must couch their decisions, not in terms of the practical consequences of adopting one rule or another, but in terms of formal legal doctrine.
At first sight, Edelman's position bears some resemblance to American realism or "judge-made" law. On closer examination, however, his thesis is fundamentally divergent because his judiciary is not construed as standing above class interests in pursuit of sociologically informed justice. Rather, Edelman's judiciary reproduces and reflects the capitalist underpinnings of technological and legal developments; knowledge possesses class interest. Still, the juridical reasoning used to facilitate economically grounded decisions often becomes more and more strained. Thus, as certain disputes over property ownership are brought into court, photography "seizes" or "catches" law "in the act" of ideological deception as it tries to accommodate structurally determined verdicts to a recalcitrant doctrine.
That judges employ tortured logic to arrive at conclusions which they have decided to reach for reasons they would prefer not to state will hardly come as a surprise to anyone who routinely reads decisions. That Edelman finds this realization an embarassment to law may have to do with differences between continental and Anglo-American legal systems; judicial decision-making has traditionally had less legitimacy in the former. But, in light of Edelman's anti-capitalist political thrust, it must be stressed that the difficulty in maintaining doctrinal consistency is unlikely to be unique to capitalist judiciaries.
Of course, it may be true that the points at which changes or inconsistencies appear vary among social and legal systems. In fact, the location of those points at which inconsistencies appear tell us something about law and its relationship to society. Edelman's study of laws pertaining to copyright for photographic and film properties, therefore, may be quite instructive if it can point to contradictions or time-lags in French legal doctrine. So too, an exploration of changes in juridical logic provides a suggestive method by which to examine the relationship between legal doctrines and specific areas of capitalist development.4
Unfortunately, Edelman offers no insight about how a particular case or category of cases comes to be resolved in the courts. The process by which a social dispute becomes translated into a legal conflict -whether resolved through negotiations among attorneys or through court actions -must be addressed if the larger workings of the courts are to be illuminated. As is known, the histories of legal actions are dependent on a variety of individual and organizational contingencies (Blumberg, 1967; Galanter, 1974; Anderson, 1980) ; Edelman disregards these dynamics. Objections that have been raise ism suggested by Althusser's IS generate and disseminate ideas capitalism cannot be easily com commodity form, whereas for bourgeoisie. Second, structurali in the productive or reproducti legal reality. Third, an ISA orie Edelman and other structuralist ensnared by ideological appeara ing all intellectual challenge.
Other related problems in the t contributor to the ideological do too readily from the way that la does not mean that the rest of that the law creates the juridica he presents no evidence that lay of law, much less that they pass dismiss the role of subjective c original impetus for ISAs. Inde cases in the United States show acceptance for unpalatable ide On the assumption that the law relations and by shaping their expose "the poverty of the apo Why not? His expectation, thou carries within itself the death failure to recognize the materi recalls the millenarian tone of r 1971; Kinoy, 1971) . While such e can only be read nostalgically a think that unmasking bourgeois We thought that Marx had sho Edelman's exaggeration of the presumed (presumed, that is, under the notion of a him from seeing that in its coercive aspec of capitalism that is quite different fro ideology. It does this not only through commanded or forbidden -in particula political arrangements may be crimina upholding or failing to uphold voluntar which law does this, it is surely necessa socializing lay persons that this doctrine sometimes the reality, of enforcement.
Though the political limitations of Ed political limits of the period in which hegemony, legislative participation by the absence of revolutionary class conflict. G war France (with the exception of the u been idealistic.
Focusing next on the commodity form in Edelman, even if we accept that the legal form facilitates commodity exchange -it is still reasonable to inquire as to the basis of comparison between these legal and economic categories as well as the basis for the original distinction. The economic commodity form stipulates that all actors are free to exchange their possessions and their labor. The stipulation appropriate to the legal form however, is less obvious. While the actor is presumably free to alienate his property or labor, the actor in capitalist democracies cannot choose to alienate legal rights such as civil liberties. At best, he may choose not to exercise these rights.
So too, a satisfactory commodity exchange theory of law must be equipped to examine the implications of the state's unique ability to impose costs for non-compliance with its rules. This ability permits the state to define subjects in contractual relations, and also to regulate the sorts of relations actors can enter. For example, there is no law requiring people to marry. But in specifying through law what sorts of relationship the courts will recognize and uphold as marriages, the state is capable of influencing private decisions about entering such agreements, even when individuals do not call upon the state's power to back them up in cases of a dispute. Such contracts demonstrate the practical limits to the state's power to reproduce bourgeois social relations and legal subjects. Ironically, private law, that most bourgeois legal arena, is treated by Edelman in a manner too simple to do justice to the reality. Of course, this need not call into question the state's formal or potential capacity to impose the commodity exchange form on legal subjects. Nevertheless, the contingent and negotiable aspects of the imposition of the legal commodity form, if it exists, are relegated to theoretical obscurity.
Edelman does, however, outline a more nuanced, if subsidiary view of the effects of legal ideology in a brief chapter on ideological struggles. Quoting Engels, he argues that when the proletariat adopts the bourgeois notion of equality and demands that the law be taken "at its word," the ultimate latent aim of the demand -whatever its immediate application -is the abolition of classes. This is so, he says, because the fulfillment of bourgeois ideas requires the abolition of bourgeois society. To take this alternative view of law is implicitly to look beyond mere annihilation of bourgeois legal categories toward their Although the works of Pashukanis and Edelman contain fresh and provocative insights regarding law, the weaknesses of their analyses should now be clear. First, because law does not literally embody relations characterized by the extraction of surplus value through the free sale of labor power, the significance of the legal commodity form is highly problematic. Legal and economic categories and conduct, while integrally linked, are not identical. Yet, it is precisely the thrust of formalist legal theories to collapse the categories of political economy and law while still relying on a substructure-superstructure model of societyeven if only "in the final analysis." Second, this collapse forbids consideration of non-economistic expressions of law and legal conduct, conduct not directly linked with the relations of production or the functional reproduction of a capitalist order. The potential for tension or contradiction is vitiated. Third, relations among individuals as well as potential challenges to existing organs of power can only drop from sight in formalist equations or be relegated to the realm of anomaly. Fourth, this orientation annihilates consideration of subjects' possible legal or political rights (whatever their genetic or immediate functional connections to capitalism), as well as individual and collective rights vis-d-vis political power. Thus, for Marxist legal formalism, law has no potential -whatever the class constellation -for development as a body of rules applied in the service of social justice and equality.
In regard to the law's legitimating and hegemonic horizons, the question arises: what might happen if people come to take seriously the unrealized promises made to them by the bourgeoisie? This locates in the conflict between the promise of formal juridical equality and substantive inequality, a potential contradiction in contemporary capitalist (and possibly socialist) societies. This conflict was germane to the civil rights and feminist movements and can be anticipated to recur. One burden, consequently, on any Marxian legal theory is to address the strategic question: how can a socialist movement best exploit such conflict?
What are the potential gains or drawbacks to a socialist movement which utilizes this arena of conflict? Such unanswered questions underscore the limitations of formalist Marxist legal theory.
This examination of two Marxist analyses of law, analyses that have generated a great deal of interest and attention, reveals how much yet remains to be done. One crucial task for a Marxian theory is to understand the role of law in relation to its social context in order to illuminate the class nature and possible opp task, a number of questions must be address forms, contents and practices of law and accounts for differences?
To date, most attempts at explaining law ties, be they liberal, corporatist, or fascist. the changes in the character of the state ass of capitalism or fascism (Neumann, Kirchhei relatively little work has been done on the s transition to an economy dominated by oli tions: regulatory law, labor law, a shift away developments have given law attributes that Edelman, as their theories are largely restr tions. Still less work has been done on law socialist societies. Until these gaps are filled, be impossible.
In attempting to answer these questions, we and factually adequate connectives between t historically there have been several capitalist major ramifications both for the substance o the necessity of taking variations in state for the possibility of providing an adequate a production or distribution alone. Cultural explicitly allowed. To carry out the sort of command of legal history than is displayed A second set of questions concerns the way capitalism. The existing literature display Quinney or Coke -have opined that the val enforcement are radically different from them, law affects behavior primarily by t takes a second position in suggesting that economic developments -can provide a basi state. The greater part of his text, howev capitalism. Lastly, since Pashukanis flatly relations or popular consciousness in serv legitimating significance is nil. Taken seriall Missing from each of these views is the in hegemony is ambiguous. Specifically, the depending on the particular case at stake. P their affairs. When they do so, however, t evade it, they bend it to their purposes and a should be. So too, they may calculate the lik 5. The handful of Anglo-American Marxian studies m (1976), Steinberg (1981) , Thompson (1975) 
